

Working Material 2.8

Operational Control of Energy and Utilities

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This sheet puts the working parts of subchapter 2.8 into editable form: the Verification Pact, the review questions, the common mistakes as a self-check and the Operative Synthesis as an action plan. The empty columns are for your property. The reasoning behind each row is in the book.

GUIDING QUESTION

An environmental objective can be well designed, properly resourced, and technically achievable — and still be quietly undone, setting by setting, by a colleague with administrative access who has never heard it exists.

Verification Pact: Market Claims Against the Standard

The first three columns are copied from the book. In the last one, note whether this claim circulates in your property — in a proposal, a brochure, a supplier's pitch or your own documents — and what you now hold instead.

What is claimed	Binding?	What actually holds	In our property
Installing a sophisticated building management system and setting an ambitious objective within it constitutes operational control of the system	No	Control requires the operating criteria to actually govern the system's operation in practice, not only its technical capability to be configured a certain way	
Engineering's legitimate authority to respond to guest comfort complaints is inherently in tension with an environmental objective and cannot be reconciled	No	The tension is real but reconcilable through logging, visibility, and coordinated response design — the Doha case shows what happens absent any attempt at reconciliation, not that reconciliation is impossible	
A local override capability retained for legitimate operational reasons falls outside the scope of clause 8.1's control requirement	No	Any capability that can materially affect a significant environmental aspect is part of the process the organisation needs to control, regardless of the legitimate reason it exists	
Monthly aggregate energy data provides sufficient monitoring of an objective's operational integrity	Not on its own	Aggregate data revealed that something was wrong without revealing what — genuine operational visibility requires monitoring capable of identifying the specific mechanism of variance, not only its net effect	
Individually reasonable actions by different functions cannot, by definition, produce an unplanned systemic deviation	They can	The Doha case demonstrates precisely this: dozens of individually reasonable engineering decisions accumulated into a substantial, entirely unplanned deviation from the approved objective	
Responsibility for an objective's failure to perform as modelled rests with whoever designed the objective, regardless of who controls the system it depends on	No	Clauses 5.3 and 8.1 call for assigned responsibilities and controlled processes; in practice that means coordinating the objective's criteria with whoever holds day-to-day control of the relevant system	

A Checklist for the Next Building System Review

Answer each question with Yes, Partly, No or N.A., and name the evidence: a record, a date, a person, a place someone can go and look. An answer without evidence is an opinion.

Question	Why it matters	Answer	Evidence
For our most significant energy-related objective, who holds actual day-to-day authority over the system it depends on?	The single question the entire Doha case turns on		
Does any override capability affecting that system generate a log visible to environmental management?	Unlogged overrides are, by definition, invisible to the monitoring meant to catch exactly this pattern		
Do overrides carry a default reversion window, or can they persist indefinitely once made?	An open-ended override is functionally a silent, permanent objective change		
Was this objective designed with direct input from whichever function retains actual system authority, or handed to them after the fact?	Doha's original design process never asked engineering whether the modelled setpoints were operationally realistic		
Do the two functions review performance data together, or does each work from its own separate view of the system?	Separate views, as at Doha for most of the affected year, can each look internally consistent while missing the interaction entirely		

Common Mistakes — Self-Check

Tick every mistake you recognise in your own property today, and write next to it where you saw it. A ticked box is not a nonconformity; it is a place to look before an auditor or an incident does.

☐	Mistake (from the book)	Where we see it
☐	Assuming installing a sophisticated system and setting an ambitious objective constitutes actual operational control of that system.	
☐	Designing an environmental objective without direct input from the function that retains actual day-to-day authority over the system it depends on.	
☐	Leaving legitimate operational override capability entirely unlogged and disconnected from environmental tracking.	
☐	Relying on aggregate monthly data alone to monitor an objective, without visibility into the specific mechanism of any variance.	
☐	Assuming individually reasonable actions by different functions cannot accumulate into a substantial, unplanned systemic deviation.	
☐	Responding to a discovered gap by restricting operational authority entirely, without considering the legitimate operational need that authority served.	
☐	Failing to build a defined reversion window into override capability, allowing exceptions to persist indefinitely by default.	
☐	Treating environmental management and facilities engineering as functions that need not coordinate directly over a shared physical system.	

☐	Mistake (from the book)	Where we see it
☐	Setting objectives so operationally aggressive that maintaining them requires constant informal correction, rather than incorporating genuine operational tolerance from the outset.	
☐	Retrofitting cross-functional coordination only after a gap is discovered, rather than building it into system design from initial installation.	

Operative Synthesis — Action Plan

The three horizons and their actions are copied from the book. Owner and due date are yours to fill: an action without both is a wish.

Horizon	Action from the book	Owner	Due date
Act on immediately	For the property's most significant energy-related objective, ask directly who holds day-to-day operational authority over the system it depends on, and whether any mechanism logs or connects their actions back to the objective's own monitoring.		
Plan for	Build automatic logging and a defined reversion window into any override capability affecting a system tied to an active environmental objective; and establish a standing joint review between environmental management and facilities engineering specifically examining override patterns, not only aggregate performance data.		
Monitor going forward	Treat unexplained variance between modelled and actual performance as a signal to investigate operational mechanism, not only external conditions — and design future objectives with direct input from whichever function retains actual system authority, building genuine operational tolerance in from the outset rather than discovering the need for it through a year of silent informal correction.		

WHAT THIS SHEET IS NOT

ISO 14001 does not prescribe this form. No clause asks for this worksheet, its columns or a register of market claims; the standard sets requirements and leaves the means to the organisation. This sheet is a working aid drawn from the book: use it, change it or set it aside. Where it touches a requirement, the text of ISO 14001:2026 is the authority, not this page — and nothing on it replaces your own reading of that text.

Source: Francesco Dore, The Helm and the Lens, Volume 1a — ISO 14001:2026, subchapter 2.8. Edizioni Effedore 2026. © 2026 Francesco Dore. Free to adapt for use in your own property. enbooks.effedore.com